Bava Kamma – “The First Gate”

• Seder Nezikin – “Book of Damages”
• Bava Kamma – “The First Gate”
• That’s it. We’re done with women. We’re on to damages, and no, they’re not directly related. This book is a series of discussions on different sections of Torah law where it ties into the Jewish civil and/or criminal court system, and the setup of the court system itself. This first tractate jumps into the middle of the laws in Exodus 21-22. It feels particularly poignant at this point in time, as, among the issues addressed in this part of Exodus are both abortion, and, the killing of people or damaging of property as collateral damage to other actions.
  • 11/4/23, Chapter 1, Page 2 – Ox. Pit. Tooth/Claw. Fire. I feel a bit like I’m looking at a word set in the NYT “Connections” game and trying to figure out the relationship. Thankfully, the rabbis do this for us. The category of “Ox” laws are those damages caused by a moving animal or object collaterally to their movement. “Pit” laws are damages caused by an immovable source, without criminal intention. “Tooth” or “claw” damages are caused by intentional acts of a  “living spirit”, while “Fire” are intentional acts without “living spirit”. There is a start exploring Ox versus Tooth with regard to a bull that tramples accidentally versus one that attacks and gores.
  • 11/5/23, Page 3 – The learned folk attempt to define the four categories from yesterday via actions – for example, Ox is broken down into Trampling and Eating, where an ox or donkey or other animal wanders off on its own and causes damage to someone else’s property by, well, trampling on it or eating it. Except when the owner of the animal deliberately or negligently sets the animal off in the direction of someone else’s property, at which point it may become Goring, and fall under Tooth/Claw. A similar dichotomy is used to separate Pit from Fire, as to whether an inanimate object, like a pit, flame, or tool, should have been more carefully tended to or protected by its owner.
  • 11/6/23, Page 4 – Continuing with contrasts to help define the categories. Eating versus Goring is on the menu today. In the case of Eating, a part of the Ox category, like Trampling, the ox, donkey, or human, is out there doing something pleasurable to itself, and causes collateral damage, or, even, the eating itself damages someone or something. In Goring, there is no pleasure, destruction is the intent, focus, and approach. They start to approach the idea that remuneration should be more severe in the case of Goring versus Eating (or Trampling).
  • 11/7/23, Page 5 – The rabbis start in on remuneration for damages on today’s page. I’m assuming this is just a broad introduction. But basically, they offer that the four categories have both overlapping and unique characteristics for paying fines and damages. If I followed it, it basically comes down to a hierarchy that includes payment for actual damages, secondary costs, fines for humiliation and/or degradation, and fines for breaking laws, and our old friend “intention” resurfaces and is applied to the different categories to determine which payments are due.
  • 11/8/23, Page 6 – I am not sure that I have this distinction firmly in my mind, something that happens often in reading the Talmud, and the reason people study and debate it at length. Pit versus Fire. Both involve an inanimate object that causes damage. Someone stumbles in a hole (a literal pit), or trips over a rock or branch; versus a fire causes damage to a nearby structure (literal) or a tool placed on a roof falls off and injures someone. Both unintentional damage, but the difference seems to be in the likelihood of foreseeing that damage. It’s murky!
  • 11/9/23, Page 7 – Back in the late 80s, I took a turn at a different career path, working in real estate, particularly, real estate appraisal, even on the track for my MAI certification. At no point in those years, nor courses, do I recall that time of year was to be taken into account in the valuation of a property. But, according to our esteemed rabbinic folk, the value of land cycles depending on how close to harvest season it is when the appraisal is done. Imagine the nightmare this would add to the scheduling of closing dates.
  • 11/10/23, Page 8 – Just as in modern times, loans back in the day were often secured by a lien on property. The better quality of the property, the better the terms of the loan, and the opposite also is true. The rabbis argue over the ethics of substituting inferior quality land for superior quality with a lien, when the latter is sold. And, also, who has first creditor rights – which, in contrast to modern times, they rank as first priority a private debtee, then an institutional one like a bank, and finally, a wife. Also, interestingly, debt cannot be inherited and is not passed down to children when a debtor dies.
  • 11/11/23, Page 9 – Wait. On yesterday’s page we were told that debt cannot be inherited. And here today, a discussion about the apportionment of debt between two sons who inherited land when their father died. This sent me back to compare the two pages. It appears that I slightly misread yesterday’s page – children don’t inherit monetary debt, like a loan, and do not have to repay monies borrowed. But a lien against property remains, so can be collected by a creditor in the form of taking a portion of land in lieu of payment.
  • 11/12/23, Page 10 – Different from the other three categories, with Fire, its inherent nature is to cause damage. That doesn’t take away from its positive effects, but it imposes on the person who is making use of it, to control it. When it causes unplanned damage to someone else’s property, that person is automatically considered liable, because unintended consequences are assumed to be preventable with proper control. This includes a person who cedes control to someone who isn’t considered competent to wield control (the usual “minors, imbeciles, and deaf-mutes” litany).
  • 11/13/23, Page 11 – The rabbis touch on what, in today’s world, has become a hot button issue – abortion. In a discussion about compensation for loss of an animal’s life due to negligence on the part of the owner of Ox or Fire or whatever that caused the damage, the sages turn to damage caused to a fetus or a newborn. They’re quite clear that a baby is not considered a human for which compensation is due until the baby reaches 30 days of age after birth. Talk about late term abortion issues!?
  • 11/14/23, Page 12 – A few pages ago we were exploring the rights of a creditor to receive land in repayment of a lien type debt. Today’s topic delves deeper and into territory that would make great fodder for an ethics class. Start with the question – is a slave part of the “immovable” land and/or house where he works or is he part of the “movable”… furniture and fixtures? Because the answer to that decided if a slave could be repo-ed to satisfy a lien or not. It’s worth noting that the idea that a slave might not be some form of property didn’t enter the conversation.
  • 11/15/23, Page 13 – The rabbis move on to competing realms, via metaphor, of course. What happens when both Ox and Pit cause damage. An example is given of one ox accidentally pushing another into a pit. The rabbinic folk opine that the liability is split between the owners of the ox and the pit. But what about, say, an ox and eating or trampling? Say your ox comes into my field, either just munching on grass, or running about wildly, and my ox defends its territory and kills or damages yours? Then, I have no responsibility, because your ox had no business being in my field.
  • 11/16/23, Page 14 – In general, it seems, that if your ox (again, both literal and metaphorical) causes damage innocuously, your liability is for half the value of what it damaged. If there was malicious intent on your part, or you knowingly let an ox noted for causing damage or rampaging out, then it’s in full. In a tangent, the sages decide that if you borrowed someone else’s ox, and it caused damage, you’re not liable unless you made it clear that you were going to safeguard it like one of your own.
  • 11/17/23, Page 15 – You will be pleased to know that with some logical gymnastics based on passages from Numbers and Exodus, the rabbis decided that the liability of an ox’s owner is the same if it is a woman who is injured or killed rather than a man. Apparently until they had this discussion, that was in doubt. I can’t say that they all seem pleased with this statement of equality of worth, but at least no one tried some other halakhic contortions to try to prove that a woman wasn’t as valuable. Small wins folks, small wins.
  • 11/18/23, Page 16 – I’m caught between two competing impulses. First, the rabbis discuss that there are five distinct kinds of damage that an animal can commit twice before it is held liable, and, presumably, slaughtered. Caveat, you must warn it both times not to do it again. Warn the animal. Twice. Yeah, I see that sinking in. Second, where on a weird tangent, the sages discuss metamorphosis, wherein a male hyena changes into an insectivore bat after seven years, and then seven years later into a herbivorous bat, then a thistle, briar, and, finally, a demon. Each seven years apart. It is not clear to me why this tangent came up, nor how any intelligent person would subscribe to this. But hey, it’s Talmudic. It will probably come back to us in reference to the reason we do some ritual on an obscure holiday.
  • 11/19/23, Chapter 2, Page 17 – If a chicken causes damage while hopping about and pecking at things, the owner is liable for 100% of the damages, because, well, it’s a chicken. That seems to be all the reasoning needed. In other news, when King Hezekiah of Judea died, 36,000 Torah scholars came to his grave to mourn and study for either 3, 7, or 30 days, no one seems sure. They did doff their robes off the shoulder as a sign of… what?
  • 11/20/23, Page 18 – Apparently, chapter 1 finished off the oxen, and we have moved on to chickens and dogs. The gist of today’s passage is that if a chicken or dog causes inadvertent damage while engaged in typical behavior, its owner is liable for full damages, because such things are easily foreseeable. On the other hand, if it is doing something atypical or unexpected and causes damage, its owner is only liable for half the damages, as it couldn’t be easily foreseen. All these animal examples, one assumes, are metaphors for incidents that involve people too – a child, a slave, an employee, etc.
  • 11/21/23, Page 19 – The sages are discussing the various types of damage (and, of course, liability for) when a chicken is pecking about, and sends pebbles flying that break vessels and windows, damage homes and people, or kicks things and causes similar damage. Now, I’ve been on farms that were raising chickens many a time. Just what the hell kind of chickens were they raising that could do this much damage with their kicks or flung pebbles?!
  • 11/22/23, Page 20 – Basically, the rabbis are reinterpreting our old friend “intention”, as applied to responsibility on the part of humans, with typical/atypical behavior on the part of animals. I’m assuming that they’re assuming that animals don’t possess intention, but rather simply innate behaviors, some of which are typical or common, and some of which deviate from the norm. Apportioning of responsibility and liability is applied much the same as for intention in humans.
  • 11/23/23, Page 21 – Today the discussion centers around combinations of events. An example, a dog snatches some food from a grill, and runs away to eat it, accidentally bringing along a small bit of glowing coal. The coal ignites a fire in the place the dog stops to eat the food. Liability of the dog’s owner? Full for the food, half for the destruction of the fire. Why? Because the first is an intentional and foreseeable act, the second is not.
  • 11/24/23, Page 22 – This random outbreak of fire takes a gruesome turn, as the rabbis discuss liability for what happens if someone’s livestock or slave is burned in the fire. Because, of course, livestock and slaves are more or less equals in their minds. They do give some intelligence credit to the slave, in that, if a goat is burned, regardless of whether it is tethered, the person responsible for the fire is liable for payment. If it’s a slave, he’s only liable if the slave was bound or shackled, because otherwise, it is assumed the slave had the opportunity to run away from the fire, and chose not to. Not always how fire situations work.
  • 11/25/23, Page 23 – We’ve all seen those TV lawyer shows where the accused argues some ridiculous counterclaim, sometimes so much so that we want them to win just to laugh about it. Referring back to the dog from two days ago who stole some food, the rabbis discuss such an idea. As, the challenger argues, the dog’s mouth is the property of the accused, then the “damage” to the food is occurring on his own property, and therefore he is not liable for payment for it. Sounds like the perfect excuse for “dine and dash”.
  • 11/26/23, Page 24 – The rabbis discuss forewarning the owner of an ox that is being violent so that he can take steps to both prevent it causing more damage, and also eliminate his liability for damages. First, they decide, that three incidents must take place on three consecutive days. Not on the same day, and not more spread out, and witnesses have to testify in court, in front of the owner, to the incidents. You’d think it’d be easier to just warn the guy, even after one incident. But then, this is more about liability than it is about safety.
  • 11/27/23, Page 25 – Today’s conversation centers around lenient versus strict punishments – why some things require full liability payment and others only half. They’ve previously discussed levels of intentionality and forewarning but want more. Bizarrely, they use the “punishment” of menstruation versus STDs (7 days vs 14 days isolation), and being in the presence of a corpse versus moving it (same isolation times). It still comes back to some level of intentionality, but now they’ve got Torah to back them up.
  • 11/28/23, Page 26 – Finally moving a bit beyond talking about animals of labor and liability, the rabbis move the conversation towards humans. Still keeping the same four categories of damages, they note that humans are basically always “forewarned” of their potential to cause damage, and/or hurt or kill someone or something, and therefore, full liability always applies when a human is the one causing damages. After all, we are considered the first or second most dangerous species on the planet.
  • 11/29/23, Chapter 3, Page 27 – A man falls from a roof, and in doing so “inserts himself into a passing woman”, he is liable for damage, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood, but not for humiliation, unless it was intentional. I have so many questions. Clothing? The bizarre geometry that would be involved in this happening. Given that they brought it up, what would have to be going through his head to have that situation be intentional?
  • 11/30/23, Page 28 – Oxen, jugs of wine, piles of property. All, in one way or another used to illustrate, metaphorically or directly, that one may take back what is theirs, if someone else has stolen it, or created an access barrier to it. The question that arises is whether one is justified in doing so on their own, or only with a court decision. The debate is contentious, especially if it involves damage or harm to the person, or his property, in question. It’s a real sheriff vs repo man sort of brawl.
  • 12/1/23, Page 29 – It’s always fascinating when the rabbis discuss people’s attempts to evade their responsibilities. Two cases are discussed today, the first where someone simply renounces their ownership of an animal that caused damage, after the fact, having decided that the liability costs are greater than the loss of the animal. The other, in the Pit category, after someone is injured in a hole on your property, you fill in the hole, then empty it out, and claim it’s a new hole and you have no idea where the hole being talked about is. Neither of these fly with the council.
  • 12/2/23, Page 30 – If you embed thorns, barbs, shards of glass in a wall protecting your property, you are not liable if someone injures themselves on them, since other than someone with ill intent towards you, no one should be rubbing themselves against your wall or climbing it. On the other hand, if you embed such things in someone else’s wall without their knowledge, you are liable if they or anyone else is hurt by them, even though the same logic might apply.
  • 12/3/23, Page 31 – Carrying crossbeams, barrels, pottery, weaving in and out of other foot traffic, it’s a dance worthy of a film sequence. It’s also a minefield of potential collisions, slips, and falls, and fodder for discussions of liability. My take-away, watch where the hell you’re going.
  • 12/4/23, Page 32 – Yesterday’s dance of crossbeam and barrel collisions takes on a whole new meaning with the rabbis having the conversation pivot to, well, penis and vagina, and whether similar rules of liability for damages incurred during foot traffic also apply to damage during sexual intercourse. This engenders an exploration of permission, intent, and even whether or not the woman can be considered an active participant in the act.
  • 12/5/23, Page 33 – Ah, the arrogance of those who think they are just a cut above all the rest. In a surreptitiously self-referential ruling, the sages opine that one’s mentee, student, apprentice, lives in complete awe of their mentor, teacher, master, and should do exactly as instructed, always. So if tell your minion to vamoose for the day, and they don’t, and they get injured because of something you do, you’re not liable, because having told them to go, you have no obligation to take safety precautions.
  • 12/6/23, Page 34 – In the event of accidental damage by an ox (or other animal) to another’s property, one’s liability is for half of the decrease in current value. Future value is not taken into consideration. In the event that the property is killed or destroyed and no longer has value, the owner of the ox that caused it is sold and the value received is split evenly between the owners.
  • 12/7/23, Page 35 – Sometimes an ox is just an ox. While much of this tractate has been about them, much of it has seemed more metaphorical than really about oxen. Or so it seemed, until today, when the rabbis delve into the question of the intelligence and creativity of the beasts. They explore reported incidents of various methods of self-cure, from causing a fire in order to use the ashes to heal a wound, to drinking liquor to numb pain. No solid conclusions are reached, of course.
  • 12/8/23, Chapter 4, Page 36 – What is an owner’s liability if his ox gores several other oxen over the course of time, it’s clear that the ox is “belligerent”, and the owner’s been warned about this? Why, the ox is sold, and the latest victim’s owner gets half the proceeds (50%), the penultimate victim’s owner gets half of what is left (25%), the next oldest gets half of that (12.5%), on down the line. Fascinating, if bizarre approach, and even more so that the belligerent’s owner gets to keep something, if an ever decreasing amount.
  • 12/9/23, Page 37 – You know, a lot of my folk complain that we get associated, negatively, with money too often, but, hey, the Talmud spends a lot of time on it – I think it’s cropped up in every tractate at some point, and often not in positive light. In a tangent, the sages discuss the case of Rabbi Yosef, who upon being awarded a small amount after a court case against someone who slapped him, snaps out to give it to the poor, “it’s not worth my time to collect it”. Shades of Bill Gates and the $100 bill on the sidewalk.
  • 12/10/23, Page 38 – This is a troubling page in the tractate, as the rabbis discuss the meaning of “other”. Superficially the argument is over liability for when one’s ox gores another’s ox. There is consensus, but not 100%, that a Jewish owner only owes damages if the other is a Jew as well, not a Gentile. In contrast, though more contentious, a Gentile owner owes damages if his ox gores a Jew’s ox. Backed by examples from other, unrelated situations, the gist of the argument is whether or not Gentiles are “lesser people” for not being Jews.
  • 12/11/23, Page 39 – We’re back to our trio of “incompetents” – deaf-mutes, minors, and imbeciles; plus, owners who are overseas. They are not liable if their ox gores someone or some thing, as they are considered incapable of being forewarned. In an interesting twist – if their status changes – they regain their hearing, they reach the age of majority, regain their senses, or return from overseas, respectively, things are reset to zero, and the ox is considered neutral unless it demonstrates further belligerence, and the now competent owner is forewarned anew.
  • 12/12/23, Page 40 – “What if”, one sage asks another, “an ox has two owners and there is a fine to be paid. The rules state “the owner must pay the fine in full”, and doesn’t posit a situation with more than one owner. Does each owner pay in full, resulting in a double fine, which fulfills the letter, but not the spirit of the law, or does each pay half, which fulfills the spirit but not the letter?” Not taking this lightly, his respondent replies that this is going to take some time to think through, and we, as well as his questioner, are left hanging.
  • 12/13/23, Page 41 – Today’s passage tackles the dicey topic of being humped by an ox. And, not because you, the human in the equation, decided to engage in intercourse with said ox, but because the ox did. And if you are injured or killed, the ox is only considered liable if it killed you with its horns, not with its… pleasure parts. And only if it was intentional on the ox’s part. I’m of mind that the whole discussion of oxen intentionality in this situation is a coverup for a human’s reputational embarrassment.
  • 12/14/23, Page 42 – In today’s situation we have an ox that has no history of rampaging, so its owner has not been warned to keep it in check. Because of this, it’s assumed that if it kills someone, it isn’t intentional, and there’s no liability. But, the rabbis go to an extreme case – what if it kills a pregnant woman, or causes her to miscarry? Is there liability for the fetus? Which seems a strange question given that they’ve already decided there’s no liability for the woman’s death or injury. And, the answer, either direction, is contested.
  • 12/15/23, Page 43 – There’s a weird Talmudic principle that a person cannot be held civilly liable crime solely by their own admission, there must be witnesses (this is separate from court proceedings for criminal charges). Sometimes. In context, if a man’s ox kills a slave and there were no witnesses, but the man admits his ox was responsible, he isn’t liable to pay compensation. Except, if the victim is not a slave, but a freeman, then he does pay, because, basically, “if there had been witnesses, they would have concurred with his testimony”. What?
  • 12/16/23, Page 44 – An interesting logical question arises. An adult human who mains or kills a child is liable for all associated costs – damages, pain, humiliation, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. On the flipside, a child who maims or kills an adult or child is not liable, as it is assumed they don’t have agency or intent. So what about oxen? In specific, do the actions of a calf, rather than an adult ox, create liability if it injures or kills a human (or another ox)? It’s quite the lively debate today, with, as usual, no solid resolution.
  • 12/17/23, Page 45 – An ox does something that may create liability. While a decision is being considered by the rabbinic court, the owner sells the ox. If the court comes back with a decision that the owner is liable, that liability falls on the new owner. If the court finds that the owner is liable, and the owner sells the ox after the decision, the sale is considered invalid, and the original owner is liable, but the ostensible new owner is not automatically given his money back. Clearly, oxen due diligence was an important step in any purchase!
  • 12/18/23, Chapter 5, Page 46 – Damage to a fetus is in the news today. To wit, a cow is found gored to death. At its side, a stillborn calf. The question, in the realm of liability, is whether the owner of the ox that gored the cow to death is considered liable for the calf’s death. Since, at least at the time, there was no way to determine if the calf was delivered before or after the goring, the rabbis decide, for a change, on a compromise position – 50% of the value of the cow, and 25% of the value of the calf, no further questions asked.
  • 12/19/23, Page 47 – The rabbis take a moment to address whether or not there is liability for an egg, laid or unlaid, when a hen is killed by another chicken. After all, they’ve just established that a stillborn calf creates liability if the mother is gored by another cow. The upshot seems to be that since we can’t see into the egg, we don’t know if it was a viable chicken or not, and therefore, no, there is no liability. We have encountered here what I’m going to call Schrödinger’s chicken.
  • 12/20/23, Page 48 – Most of this page focuses on liability when someone is in another’s home or workplace with, or without, permission. But an end note caught my eye, as the rabbis discuss the amount of compensation to pay a woman’s husband if you, or your ox, accidentally causes her to miscarry. The amount is set at the marketplace difference between her value “if she were to be sold as a servant” before versus after giving birth.
  • 12/21/23, Page 49 – Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel is not pleased with yesterday’s ruling on the valuation of liability. After all, he opines, a woman’s value goes up after she’s given birth – because, well, she can do more chores, and, you know, is ready to get pregnant again. No, he says, the liability value should be the value of selling the baby on the open market, not the woman. I’m fairly certain he has not made this conversation better by speaking.
  • 12/22/23, Page 50 – Digging a pit, tunnel, or cave on public property, even with all appropriate permits, creates liability for pedestrian safety, unless measures are taken to protect them, like signage and surrounding the opening with a fence or wall. The rabbis also opine that the same is true on private property, because even though a pedestrian who injures themselves might be trespassing, the owner should still take safety precautions to protect the public. I’m just glad we’ve moved on from the category of Ox liability to Pit liability.
  • 12/23/23, Page 51 – While it is true that an ox or donkey might stumble into an open pit that doesn’t have a fence around it, it is not simply the pit, and its depth, that might cause them harm or death. It is, the rabbis murmur, also the “lethal fumes” that might be emanating from it. They’re not going to discuss that this pit is a cesspool, filled with human and animal waste. We’re just going to keep repeating “but, the lethal fumes…” and fanning themselves delicately.
  • 12/24/23, Page 52 – In the course of a discussion about damage caused by a group of oxen, goats, or sheep, the rabbis’ eyes alight on the flock’s leader, the mashkukhit, but lays the blame on the shepherd, who, if his head is not in the game, basically makes the flock’s leader blind. Rabbi Ya’akov points out that this is like when God is angry with us, he ensures that our leader is “blind”, i.e., incompetent and without a moral compass. One might hazard a guess that God is really pissed off at us these days.
  • 12/25/23, Page 53 – If an ox falls forward into a pit, the owner of the pit is liable for its value, because it is assumed he didn’t provide adequate safety precautions either around the pit or regarding lethal fumes (we’re back to those). If, however, the ox falls backward into the pit, the pit’s owner is not liable, because he is not required to ensure the safety of an ox who is not paying attention to where it is going. I foresee applications to drivers 1500 years in the future, i.e., now.
  • 12/26/23, Page 54 – Talmudic passages like those of this tractate are often treated as metaphor for human interactions. Is this a valid approach. Preemptively, the Talmudic rabbis discuss this on today’s page, breaking it down to the choice of language – does it specify “ox”, or does it start a list with “oxen and donkeys”, or even “flocks”. Does the choice of singular or plural, sanctified or not, indicate whether the principles should be generalized? As always, there’s no agreement, and we are left hanging.
  • 12/27/23, Page 55 – As we wrap up this chapter with a discussion on different species and telling them apart, that seems to have no relationship to our discussion of liability, we have quite the conundrum. According to Abbaye, the way to tell the difference between a wild goose and a domestic goose is that the former has external testes, i.e., a scrotum, while the latter does not. Ornithologists agree that there are no bird species with external… ball sacks… so Abbaye was, well, wrong.
  • 12/28/23, Chapter 6, Page 56 – We open this chapter with an overview of six situations where the rabbis note that one may not be liable for damages under civil or criminal law, but which are morally wrong and that will be judged by God. Most of these revolve around circumstances that today we’d either call contributory negligence, or failure to take reasonable precautions. You may be able to wash your hands of your deeds in human court, but not in the court of Heaven.
  • 12/29/23, Page 57 – If you find a lost or stolen object, and go to return it to the owner, but find the owner not home, and leave it in a place where the owner will find it, this is considered the fulfillment of a good deed. After all, you tried, and you can’t be expected to sit around waiting for the owner. However, if the object gets stolen before the owner returns, you are now financially on the hook for it, for not safeguarding it. Seems a really bad rabbinic ruling to me, as it basically says… don’t get involved.
  • 12/30/23, Page 58 – Who has jurisdiction over liability disputes – the beit din, the rabbinical court, or the Exilarch, the secular leader of the Jewish community? When they issue competing rulings, which one takes precedence? Well, that all depends. “On what?” you might rightfully ask. And, you wouldn’t get a satisfying answer, because it simply comes down to “that depends”, and seemed to result in two parties to litigation disagreeing about which court’s ruling they wanted to follow.
  • 12/31/23, Page 59 – If your animal ate unripe grapes from someone’s vine, you are liable for the future value of the grapes when mature. If it eats unripe figs, you are liable for the difference in the value of the orchard before and after it ate. Why the difference? Grapes stress the vines, so relieving the vine of stress benefits the plant, whereas figs don’t, and somehow this relates to that a rapist does not have liability for pain and suffering if he rapes a virgin, because rape or no, her first time will cause pain and suffering, so he’s just gotten that out of the way for her.
  • 1/1/24, Page 60 – If you see male dogs crying, get away fast, it means the Angel of Death is nearby, yet, if you see them playing happily, you are in a good place, the spirit of Elijah is there to protect you. Male dogs are attuned to the supernatural, you see. Unless a female dog is nearby, in which case the male dogs are likely only crying or playing in order to impress her, and their actions are no longer a reliable indicator of which spirit is in the area. I do not know why we are on this tangent.
  • 1/2/24, Page 61 – Slash and burn is a commonly used technique in farming and forestry to clear out underbrush and make the land ready for use. Apparently it was “back then” as well, as the rabbis discuss the liability for damage to someone else’s property if the fire leaps a fence or a waterway. They establish minimums – 24 feet wide for water, and 6 feet high for a fence – as long as those minimums are met, there is no liability. I don’t know exactly what fences were like back then, but that seems a bit iffy to me.
  • 1/3/24, Page 62 – Unsubstantiated claims are a problem for courts everywhere. In context, someone accidentally, or, on purpose, burns down another’s house, or causes some container, like a sack, or box, to be lost. The owner claims that some particular valuables were lost in the fire or accident. Is the accused responsible for their cost? It depends on if it’s “customary” to have such objects in the claimed place. It’s also based on character witnesses for the accuser. It’s basically a crapshoot.
  • 1/4/24, Chapter 7, Page 63 – One of the things that’s challenging in reading and/or studying Talmud is understanding why sometimes the rabbis generalize a principle from Torah verses and sometimes they focus on the specific. On today’s page we learn that one of the clues, that someone, sometime, decided was important – a specific detail sandwiched between two generalizations is there in order to call one’s attention to the detail, and in such cases that should always be the focus.
  • 1/5/24, Page 64 – If a thief comes forward and confesses his theft, he is liable only for the return of the object stolen, or its value. If he is discovered, or found through witnesses, to have committed a theft he is liable not only for the same, but for penalties, at the discretion of the judges of the court. It’s interesting that the takeaway is that if you steal it’s best to confess and return the object, rather than “Thou shalt not steal” in the first place.
  • 1/6/24, Page 65 – Oh the conniving wiles of a thief. He is caught with your goods, in this case, some livestock – an ox, a sheep, a goat. It has wasted away, and he claims that its value is minimal, that restitution should be as well. Or, he has fattened it up, readying it for the dinner table, and he claims that any restitution should be reduced by the amount of added value now that the animal has been returned. The rabbis demur, and rule that a thief pays restitution and penalties based on value at the time of theft.
  • 1/7/24, Page 66 – In the infamous wars of words and ideas between the two famed sages Hillel and Shammai, I have to admit, I often come down on the side of Shammai. For example, on today’s page they are discussing a thief who steals something, and then repurposes it, makes it better, makes it into something else. Hillel says that by having changed the nature of the item, the thief acquires it, and is now the rightful owner. Shammai says, f*ck that, it’s stolen, it belongs, and always will belong, to the person it was stolen from.
  • 1/8/24, Page 67 – Our thief steals construction materials, and uses them in the building of a consecrated structure – a ritual bathhouse, a prayer hall, a study center. The Torah says the item must be returned to its owner when the thief is caught or comes forward. Not wanting their sacred spaces torn down, nor even deconsecrated, the rabbis agree with Hillel from yesterday, and decide that the item has been changed, and no longer belongs to its original owner, and a simple payment for value, like a purchase, is just fine.
  • 1/9/24, Page 68 – A theft has occurred long ago and the owner has given up hope of ever seeing his property – but one day the thief is caught and the property returned. Many of the sages argue that given the owner’s despair, and lack of hope, and the return of the property, the thief owes nothing more, and is no longer punishable, because the owner had moved past caring. Not all agree, and there’s a lively argument, but more and more I get the sense that thievery was considered by them as just another profession to be regulated, as opposed to an avocation that was considered morally wrong.
  • 1/10/24, Page 69 – There is definitely something fishy going on with the thievery world. You see, there are thieves, and there are robbers. The former are sneaky, and do things in stealth, the latter are brazen, and steal openly. Robbers, by virtue of their openness, are not subject to penalties when caught, just restitution, whereas thieves are subject to additional penalties. But, if a thief knows he’s about to be caught, he can openly confess, return the stolen goods or their value, and not be subject to additional financial penalties. This is weird.
  • 1/11/24, Page 70 – A thief claims that he is not a thief at all, and has a document from the original owner transferring ownership of the object or animal in question, under certain conditions, which the thief claims he has met. The original owner claims the document is fake, or that the conditions have not been met. Expected questions are raised – authenticity of the document, and, indeed, whether the conditions have been met. One caveat is expounded in depth – if the conditions met involved violating the Sabbath, the absolved thief may not have financial liability, but may well be executed for that violation!
  • 1/12/24, Page 71 – Continuing from yesterday’s death penalty for violating the Sabbath, what if the thief didn’t himself violate it, but instructed someone else to do whatever it was with the stolen object or animal that caused the violation? Well in that case, since he’s not going to be put to death, the thief does owe financial penalties to the original owner. And in regard to other important holidays, like Yom Kippur, since there is no death penalty for violating it… just lashes… he owes fines. Death is your only way out of paying the fines, it seems.
  • 1/13/24, Page 72 – Our thief gets a break today when it is discovered that witnesses to his crime embellished the story – making up parts of what they claimed to have seen in order to make sure he is caught. The thief no longer owes any restitution or fines – everything is ordered paid by the witnesses for having not stuck to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Also, Rav Nahman changes his vote on a previous thief related crime, claiming that he was hangry and couldn’t think straight.
  • 1/14/24, Page 73 – Witnesses who are found to be “conspiring”, i.e., lying in order to put blame for a crime on someone, are disqualified. The question arises, if they’ve been a witness in previous situations, does this disqualify their past testimony. Abaye says yes… we can’t trust anything they’ve ever said. Rava says no… we’d have to go back and re-try all the cases they were part of and that would be sooooo much work. Sounds like the argument heard in many a legal TV series.
  • 1/15/24, Page 74 – If witnesses conspire to free a slave by testifying that the slave’s master injured them in such a way that they were required to be freed (the two oft cited reasons are damage to an eye or the knocking out of a tooth), and are later exposed, they owe the slave’s master for the value of the slave and any compensation he had to pay the slave for damages. Somewhat surprisingly, given some past attitudes towards slaves, the freed slave is not re-enslaved. Though I guess that fits a model where slavery was considered purely an economic interaction.
  • 1/16/24, Page 75 – A thief knows that he’s about to be exposed for theft of an animal, and he’ll be liable to pay for its value. If he slaughtered it rather than sold it, he is also liable for fines. So, he goes to the court and admits he stole the animal, but didn’t slaughter it, he just resold it. He pays the owner for the value. Witnesses arrive, and testify that he did slaughter it. The court cannot now impose fines, because liability and fines are a package deal, and the latter can’t be imposed separately. A weird sort of double indemnity.
  • 1/17/24, Page 76 – We continue this weird sort of possessional liability. If a thief of an animal consecrates the animal to God, via an official temple, he relieves himself of liability for fines to the original owner, and only has to pay the base value. Why? Because in consecrating an animal, it is not considered as losing possession, the person who consecrated maintains ownership even as the physical body of the animal passes on to the Temple and God. Therefore, it’s not like he sold it. So say the sages.
  • 1/18/24, Page 77 – If a thief steals an animal and sells “part of it” – various examples are given – a partnership in ownership, slaughtering and selling it off in pieces as meat, or one or two slightly more gruesome thoughts – he owes the standard liability, plus a double fine. Now that’s versus the quadruple or quintuple fines that are assessed for selling the whole animal. Is this double fine assessed “per piece”, or just once? Enquiring minds want to know.
  • 1/19/24, Page 78 – I follow a Facebook group that explores some of the topics raised daily in these pages. One person asked this morning why Temple priests don’t just ask everyone if the sacrificial animal is stolen, and that will prevent a stolen animal from ever being sacrificed. Another noted that offering a stolen animal as a sacrifice would be breaking the rules and dishonest, and good people just wouldn’t do that. I find myself wondering if these people understand the concept of “thief”?
  • 1/20/24, Page 79 – If a thief stole an animal and used it as collateral to protect or save another person, to pay off a serious debt, or to redeem someone from indenture, he is not liable for any fines, just the value of the animal. I’m assuming, though without evidence (that’s what assuming is, I guess), that the rabbinical court at the least requires some sort of proof that the “I needed it for a really good reason” defense is valid?
  • 1/21/24, Page 80 – We veer off into the world of small animals. At some point, the sages had apparently ruled that one cannot raise such animals in urban areas – dogs, cats, sheep, goats, and genets (a new one for me, appearing a bit like a larger feral mongoose or ferret) – because they posed a danger to small children and also might eat one’s neighbors’ gardens. You were allowed to keep them briefly, up to 30 days, if chained up. It also becomes clear that when talking about cats and dogs they’re not talking about the domesticated versions we know today, but something more on the savage side.
  • 1/22/24, Page 81 – Footpaths, E-paths, GR routes, long-distance trails, whatever name they may be called where you live, these hiking routes have a history that goes back to antiquity. Today we find that Joshua, Moses’ successor, had a list of his own ten commandments, all related to access to cities, forests, and waterways, that gave walkers, probably nomads at that time, ten specific rights of passage, firewood, food and water, across and around private property, without impediment.
  • 1/23/24, Page 82 – If you spend any time with the Talmud, you know that parsing sentences, both for structure and content, is at its core. So of course yesterday’s list of ten commandments of rights-of-way by Joshua was going to get a lot of scrutiny. The contents of his rules aren’t really in dispute, just whether or not, given the wording, there are really ten rules, or maybe there are eleven, or twelve, or nine. Because the Talmudic rabbis have to show that they’re paying attention to the details, right?
  • 1/24/24, Chapter 8, Page 83 – We are reminded that there are five types of compensation for an injury – damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood or income, and humiliation. We are further reminded that the last of those, humiliation, generally only applies to important people, people of stature, people of wealth, because their reputation and status might be affected, while someone… lesser… can’t really claim that anyone cares about either their reputation or stature.
  • 1/25/24, Page 84 – The sages turn their attention to the “an eye for an eye” Torah principle. Some feel it implies restitution, but the majority come down on the side of literality – an injury is compensated by an equal injury to the perpetrator. Which leads to what if the perpetrator already has that injury? Bizarrely most decide that he is then exempt from punishment. Or how does one create equal injuries when there is a size differential in the two parties, leading to a discussion of proportional response – particularly poignant these days.
  • 1/26/24, Page 85 – How much money is appropriate compensation for pain and suffering? In modern times, a judge or jury makes the decision, based on some nebulous feelings about it all. The Sages took a rather different approach. Ask yourself how much money it would take for you to allow me to anesthetize you and remove your hand surgically; and then, how much money it would take for you to allow me to hack your hand off with a knife or sword, no anesthetic. The difference is the compensation for pain and suffering.
  • 1/27/24, Page 86 – Either the DNA of Jewish men has changed radically since the 4th century, or these guys were living in denial. They declare that there is no greater humiliation for a man to suffer than losing his hair. Beyond that I can think of at least a couple of things I would think would be more humiliating, I’m trying to think of Jewish men who I know who aren’t losing their hair.
  • 1/28/24, Page 87 – Let’s see… blind people, deaf-mute people, imbeciles, minors, and slaves, are not due compensation for humiliation after being injured because… what is there to humiliate? How could injuring them cause humiliation that’s greater then their very existence? There are days reading these tractates when, while I know that society was very different in the past, I just wonder how human beings could interact with other human beings in this manner. Then I look at social media and television and realize we haven’t changed all that much.
  • 1/29/24, Page 88 – If a son or wife sells a man’s property it comes with certain conditions. This assumes the man doesn’t know about it, nor approve. The purchaser does not take ownership until the man dies, even if he has paid upfront. But it also comes with a risk, if the son or wife dies before their father/husband, the purchaser loses whatever he has paid and has no claim on either a refund nor the property. This feels like a plot element in at least half a dozen movies that I’ve seen.
  • 1/30/24, Page 89 – Building on yesterday, for a change, if the property a wife wants to sell to someone is something that is specifically hers to sell because it’s written into their marriage contract, she can’t sell it. Even though it won’t become the purchaser’s property until her husband dies and she comes into possession of it, it is considered like she’s selling off the value of her marriage, demeaning it and herself, and is grounds for not just divorce, but divorce where her husband gets 100% of their property.
  • 1/31/24, Page 90 – Humiliation is the topic the rabbis come back to over and over. Today we have a hierarchy of the humiliation levels of being struck by another, with compensation for that humiliation. 100 dinars for being struck by a fist (presumably because it’s sort of manly or something), 200 dinars for being slapped with an open palm, and 400 dinars for being slapped with the back of the hand, defined as the most degrading sort of assault a man can experience from another man.
  • 2/1/24, Page 91 – If you dig a hole and don’t put up appropriate safeguards, and someone falls into it and is either injured or dies, what is your liability? If the hole is 10 handbreadths (about 30 inches) or less, you are only liable for injuries, as a hole that is so shallow can’t reasonably be the cause of someone’s death. If it’s more than 30″, you could be held liable for the person’s death. For a change, humiliation of the person who fell in the hole is not mentioned.
  • 2/2/24, Page 92 – Paying out all one’s various liabilities handles the civil, earthly end of things. However, if you’ve killed or permanently injured someone, you’re not right with God until you ask your victim (or their family) for forgiveness… and receive it. Heaven’s not interested in your money, you have to be a-okay in your interpersonal milieu.
  • 2/3/24, Chapter 9, Page 93 – When assessing the value of a payment for theft, the courts base it on the value at the time of theft. This came up earlier, at the beginning of this tractate, but is expanded on more fully here. This assumes that the object or animal cannot be simply returned, which is considered to cover the value. If the thief has made significant changes to the object – turned wool into clothing or wood into furniture – he pays on the value of the raw wool or wood, not the finished object.
  • 2/4/24, Page 94 – I, and I’m guessing most of you, have a really different understanding of the role of a thief in society – I’ve mentioned this before in the series of pages in the 60-80 range. It seems, that if a a thief steals from you, improves the object that he stole from you, gets caught, and returns the object to you, you owe him for the improvements, or, you renounce your ownership and let him keep it. This sounds like a golden setup for a conman.
  • 2/5/24, Page 95 – Rabbi Meir has a counterargument to yesterday’s musings. If a thief has improved an object he stole, the thief owes the owner for the increase in value as well as the original value; and if he returns the improved item, well, that’s just the cost of the thievery business. But no, say the others. By that reasoning, if a thief devalues or destroys an object he stole, then he would owe less, or nothing, if you’re basing compensation on change of value. The intricacies these guys get into.
  • 2/6/24, Page 96 – A thief steals an object, and improves it, thereby increasing its value. He then sells it to someone else, making a profit. The thief is later caught, and while criminal sanctions may be imposed, his civil liability is nil, because he no longer possesses the object to return it. The purchaser is on the hook for the value of the original object, as the only thing he was entitled to buy was the improvement to it. Someone, somewhere, must have written at length about the special rights that thieves had in the Talmudic society.
  • 2/7/24, Page 97 – There is a discussion about the use of foreign coinage to pay a liability, with most of the rabbis declaring it invalid, since it can’t be used as a tithe. Rav Nahman disagrees, pointing out that “some of us like to travel and see other places” and could use those coins. Rav Yosef bar Hama’s son blurts out that Rav Nahman keeps a special slave who dances in his wine cellar for private showings. One wonders both why Hama’s son is in this conversation, and how he knows this? Wink, wink.
  • 2/8/24, Page 98 – We start with a thief stealing a valuable coin and throwing it in the ocean. While morally and ethically wrong, the sages, particularly Rambam and Rashi, say that as long as you can see the coin, as long as it’s visible, it’s not lost, and it hasn’t lost any value, so there is no theft, and no liability. The metaphor expounded after, is on the principle of things which are visible, or visualizable, are recoverable, and therefore not gone. This feels like a movie trope where someone is “forced” into crime for revenge.
  • 2/9/24, Page 99 – A woman wants to marry a jeweler, or, perhaps just wants some jewelry, it’s not clear. She tells a jeweler that if he makes her some jewelry, she will be betroth him. This is not s a valid betrothal, because the man is performing his trade and therefore it’s like he’s loaning her money unless she pays for it. Loans are not valid for betrothal, as they must be repaid. He must add money of his own or the betrothal isn’t binding, which might have been her plan to start.
  • 2/10/24, Page 100 – If a judge in a civil case makes a ruling that someone is not liable to pay compensation to a complainant, and is later found to have made an incorrect ruling, the person who would have had to pay is off the hook – but the judge is required to pay the compensation to the victim out of his own, personal funds. Likewise, the reverse, if he makes someone pay who shouldn’t have had to, he has to pay them back, not the person who got the judgment. Think of the impact that would have on our modern day civil court system.
  • 2/11/24, Page 101 – What if? (Okay, I know we’re getting near the end of the tractate with these…) What if a monkey breaks into a dyer’s place, steals dye belonging to one person and cloth to another, mixes the dye up and dyes the cloth… who’s liable? Which leads, obviously to a discussion of woad, a plant that produces blue dye, which leads scholars to argue over tekheleth, a blue dye of unknown origin, which might be woad, or not, and besides some people use woad as the name for blue dye rather than the plant. So there.
  • 2/12/24, Page 102 – It is a mitzvah, a good thing, to donate things like clothing for the poor, or for the priests, or for God. But… let’s be clear guys, not your wife’s clothes or shoes. Those are hers, and donating them for whatever cause is up to her, not you, even if you paid for them. Keep your hands off your wife’s shoes. Apparently, it needed to be not just said, but codified into Talmudic rulings.
  • 2/13/24, Page 103 – If a robber steals something, and swears in court that he did not steal it, but later is found guilty, he has violated two of the ten commandments – thou shalt not steal, and, thou shalt not bear false witness. Here, the rabbis impose an additional “punishment” on the robber – not only does he have to return the object or pay its value, plus a fine, but he has to publicly apologize to his victim, even if it means traveling at his own expense to distant lands – defined as “as far as Medina”… roughly 700 miles from Jerusalem.
  • 2/14/24, Page 104 – Why, one might ask, must an admitted robber travel to wherever his victim is and personally return the object or monetary value, and a fine? Why can he not deliver it to an agent of his victim, or a family member? Because, say the rabbis, it is as if the victim gave the robber the object or money to hold for him, as a personal confidence, and only he can verify its return. That, is the weirdest interpretation of the relationship between a robber and victim I think I’ve ever seen.
  • 2/15/24, Page 105 – There are some who say that if you get from point A to point B it doesn’t matter how you got there – that’s to say, the ends justify the means. The rabbis disagree, using the example of Nazarite who commits to shaving his head, but leaves two hairs unshaven, and then the hairs fall out on their own, has not fulfilled the obligation to shave his head, even though it is bare. It’s not enough to coast on happenstance or the work of others, and then claim credit, you gotta do the work.
  • 2/16/24, Page 106 – Someone swears they didn’t steal your money or thing, or swears they don’t have your money or thing. In court. The court case is closed. The victim, probably still upset, is given no real choice but to accept the decision. What to do when it is found later that the oath was false. Does double jeopardy protect them, given that the court has already ruled on the case, or can it be re-opened because of the new information? It’s a vigorous debate, with no final agreement.
  • 2/17/24, Page 107 – We’ve seen time and again the power given to oaths sworn before God. In modern times people swear “to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God”. What if, Rabba asks, a person lies when swearing he doesn’t owe another money? Perhaps he’s short of cash and is just avoiding things until he has the funds? Perhaps he just doesn’t want to pay someone back? Perhaps, he suggests, an oath before God has no more power than any other statement.
  • 2/18/24, Page 108 – The whole false oath thing carries over to today, where we are told that if someone steals something, later admits that he stole it, and returns it, or its value, he owes an additional 20% as a fine. We know that from earlier pages in this tractate. However, if the thief actually swears before God that he didn’t steal it, and witnesses or evidence prove that he did, he owes double. So there are consequences to false oaths.
  • 2/19/24, Page 109 – A son steals from his parents, but by the time he has developed a conscience and wants to make restitution, his parents have died, and he has inherited their estate. The rabbis say that he still owes restitution, and if there are no co-heirs to repay, he repays to the the priests at the Temple. Why the priests? Is it a scam? No, he repays his debt to the Jewish people as a whole, acknowledging that we are all one big family.
  • 2/20/24, Page 110 – There are only a couple of mitzvahs, commandments that make the world better, that directly involve food. However, there are quite a few that enjoin us to celebrate and enjoy life. Somewhere along the line the Talmudic sages decided that food and drink, and not necessarily in moderation, were a big contribution to the joy of living. Not surprising for a group of self-important men arguing philosophy, morality, and ethics, over dinners replete with numerous dishes and copious amounts of wine.
  • • 2/21/24, Chapter 10, Page 111 – What are the responsibilities of the children of a thief? That is, apparently, the theme of this last chapter of the tractate. We start with a broad statement, that if a thief steals an object or money and uses it to feed his children, they bear no responsibility in the future to return the object or repay the theft, after their father dies. But, we then have a first exception – if the thing stolen was collateral for a loan, they must repay it or return it, as it must be available to guarantee the original owner’s debt.
    • 2/22/24, Page 112 – If the Court issues a summons for a debtor to appear and he doesn’t show up, they can assume he is in default and issue a collection decree. The decree doesn’t allow for collection for 90 days because during the first 30 days he might be looking for a way to pay back the loan, during the second 30 days he might have found a way, but needs time to finalize the terms, and during the last 30 days his deal might be signed, but he has yet to collect it. To me, this just seems like allowing him to kick the can down the road for who he owes money to, and when.
    • 2/23/24, Page 113 – If the Court issues a summons for a man to appear to answer charges, and he doesn’t show up, what are they to do? Well, not much really. After all, he’s a Man, and Men have things to do that might keep them busy and not have time for court. At the least, give him another chance, and another, and another. But women are another story. After all, women don’t do anything but sit around at home. If they don’t show up in answer to a summons, they are clearly Rebellious! We can’t have Rebellious Women on our hands!
    • 2/24/24, Page 114 – If two Jews own adjacent land, one cannot sell his land to a gentile without knowledge and acquiescence of the other. Why? Because it is, the rabbis rule, the equivalent of placing a non-domesticated lion at the gates of his neighbor’s home, a direct threat and danger to his existence and way of life. Interesting that this two millennia-old truism is circling back and becoming relevant all over again.
    • 2/25/24, Page 115 – Again, we are back to bizarre rules for thieves. A thief steals an object and sells it. The person who bought it may sell it on to someone else, who may do the same. Regardless of the number of sales, the sages rule that the thief, while he may be responsible for paying a fine or going to jail for the theft, is not responsible for the return of the object. The original owner needs to go to the current owner and pay them the full amount they paid if he wishes to retrieve the object.
    • 2/26/24, Page 116 – Guards employed to protect one’s property are free to leave an employer’s service at any time, as long as they give notice, though there is no timing requirement, unless they have a written contract specifying other terms. Persons who stop a thief, after he has left a burgled property, and recover the stolen goods, don’t have to return them to the owner. The sages discuss the potential (movie plot) disaster of a guard seeing a robbery taking place, notifying the owner that he quits, and waiting for the thieves to leave the property, stopping them, and keeping the stolen goods for himself. Written employment contracts are recommended.
    • 2/27/24, Page 117 – Kahana, a brilliant student, kills a fellow student who was about to betray the Jews to the Babylonians. He’s sent to Jerusalem, in exile, to study with Yohanan, the leading teacher at the rabbinical academy. He’s admonished to keep a low profile and just learn without challenging Yohanan. He does so, but this leads Yohanan to believe he’s a lazy student, and a series of events leads to Yohanan having Kahana killed, due to an imagined slight. Learning of his mistake, he goes to the burial site and prays for Kahana’s resurrection, which is granted, and the two reconcile. But this isn’t the only time Yohanan has someone killed over his imaginings… to be continued in future readings….
    • 2/28/24, Page 118 – It’s prohibited to buy milk, wool, or lambs from shepherds who are employed by others as they might be stealing those from the owner. Likewise no produce or wood from someone whose job is to guard fields or orchards. On the other hand, if a woman is offering any of those things, as well as eggs and chickens, it’s fine to buy from her, because women don’t steal and it’s assumed they have the owner’s consent. I’m not sure if this is a positive or negative bit of misogyny.
    • 2/29/24, Page 119 – We end this tractate as many of them have ended, with a few scattered loose ends that someone felt the need to tie up. Like how much women should be allowed to donate to charity, since they may not have permission for the donation from their husband or father. How strong the stitching on a garment should be, and how many loops of thread are necessary to not leave it open to damage. It’s a reminder that this tractate is, in many ways, the epitome of “God (or Morality, or Compassion, or Humanity) is in the details”.

Go back to Kiddushin – “Betrothal 

Go forward to Bava Metzia – The Middle Gate

Go back to Main Page