Bava Metzia – “The Middle Gate”

• Seder Nezikin – “Book of Damages”
• Bava Metzia – “The Middle Gate”
• Having dispensed summarily with the introduction to damages in Bava Kamma, and the separation of types by whether they are criminal or civil, and intentional or not, we move on to specifics. This second tractate is focused on civil matters, particularly those around property law, with a section devoted to responsibility for property that’s been entrusted to someone to care for and/or guard, and usury (monetary lending practices). Listening in and reading discussions by Talmudic scholars, this tractate is posited as an analogy over the ownership of Jewish heritage and tradition, and “who gets to interpret the word of God, and the laws”. A linguistic tangent that I find curious and interesting, in Aramaic, “metzia” means “middle”, but in Hebrew and Yiddish, “metzia” means “a lucky break”, “a bargain”, “a real find”. Hopefully we will spend less time on cows.
  • 3/1/24, Chapter 1, Page 2 – We open with two people claiming ownership of a sacred garment, a tallis. In one situation, each claiming full ownership, no evidence to support one or the other’s claim, and both willing to swear an oath before God, it’s easy – the court grants them each half ownership, and done. In the other instance presented, one claims full ownership, the other claims it is jointly owned by them. In a ruling worthy of game theory, the rabbis state that since one person admits the other owns half, that half is not in dispute, only the second half is, and so it is split between them, resulting in 3/4 and 1/4 ownership.
  • 3/2/24, Page 3 – Two people deposit money in the care of a supposedly responsible person. The guardian doesn’t keep good records and doesn’t remember who left which amount. Both depositors are willing to swear an oath that they left the bigger amount. The initial ruling is give them both the smaller amount and leave the rest in escrow “until Elijah returns and decides”, basically, never. This leads to an argument, as it punishes the person telling the truth, and costs the liar nothing. Which leads to a whole lot of what-ifs.
  • 3/3/24, Page 4 – As the rabbis continue discussing disputed claims of ownership, it strikes me that they are less concerned with a just resolution than they are with administering oaths. And apparently I’m not the only one who has noticed this, as numerous Talmudic scholars have delved into why oaths are so important in Jewish tradition. Is it that it’s one of the Ten Commandments? Is it the severity of punishment for swearing a false oath or violating a true one? We may never know.
  • 3/4/24, Page 5 – Someone suspected of financial impropriety based on the statements of two witnesses is automatically considered dishonest. Therefore, any oath they take is suspect. This presents an interesting problem for the rabbis hearing a case, since the witnesses make the defendant’s testimony moot. But at the same time, they understand that witnesses could be lying, and the defendant may be innocent of the charges. What to do? Interestingly, it’s left undecided, and in the hands of the rabbis hearing the case.
  • 3/5/24, Page 6 – Only in a milieu where “possession is proof of ownership” could this situation take place. Two people show up to the court, both hanging on to the same object. One of them wrests control of it from the other, in full view of the court. The judges wait to see what the other does. Does he immediately and loudly object, does he try to take back his share of control? If not, why not? Is he admitting it’s not really his? After all, the one person now has full possession of the object, it really isn’t relevant how it happened, is it?
  • 3/6/24, Page 7 – Not all objects are homogenous. That’s to say, using our several day example, if two people are claiming ownership of a cloth, or garment, and a part of that cloth has been adorned with literal gold thread, when it comes time to divide it, the law requires that each person gets not just their percentage share of the cloth, but also of the gold, so that their portions are of equal value, not just size. This is, of course, extended to other contested properties.
  • 3/7/24, Page 8 – Once again, people who are deaf-mute are singled out in a series of discussions over their rights to possess property. This may run on a little, as I finally did more of a dive into why this is contentious. First off, these particular rules apply to someone who is both deaf and mute, not just one or the other. The reasoning, back in the day, was that if someone couldn’t hear to understand, nor speak to convey understanding, it was assumed that they didn’t understand, period. This was not unique to Judaism. In the 7th century, one archbishop was actually canonized for performing a miracle simply because he taught someone who was deaf-mute to read and write. Sign languages and schools for the hearing and speech disabled didn’t start showing up until the 17th and 18th centuries. And it was into the 19th century before Judaism really began to reassess its assumptions on the topic. And there are still holdouts, especially in ultra-orthodox circles, who still assume that the lack of hearing and/or speech, and especially both, indicate a lack of mental competence. That, too, unfortunately, is not unique to Judaism.
  • 3/8/24, Page 9 – Sitting on a camel or donkey, holding the reins, and riding it around in public, was considered equivalent to having acquired it. So sellers knew that if someone wanted to “test drive” their camel or donkey, it had to be kept on their property, not allowing the potential purchaser to head to a public space. I’m keeping this in mind next time I want to test drive a car… especially if I’m buying it from someone who follows Talmudic law.
  • 3/9/24, Page 10 – In a statement that has really interesting application to modern day employment law, the Talmud makes quite clear: “a Jew can never be enslaved to another Jew with a contract from which he cannot release himself whenever he wishes.” It is in context over whether an employee can choose at any moment to quit his employment and act on his own behalf, with no restrictions imposed by his employer. No NDAs, no non-competes, no-intellectual property losses.
  • 3/10/24, Page 11 – There are limits, thankfully, to all these “acquisition by possession” examples. You can’t simply go grab someone’s livestock and claim it as yours, not even if you find it wandering free, or running across your, or someone else’s lands. If it’s identified as belonging to someone, you can’t take possession. The rabbis want to make sure we know that the last ten pages all apply to objects and animals that are, at least to appearances, ownerless.
  • 3/11/24, Page 12 – A minor, a deaf-mute (here we are again), or an imbecile do not acquire found ownerless property for themselves, but for their father, guardian, or employer. However, the rabbis opine, if the found property is not of some great value or benefit, it’s generally best to let them keep it, so they don’t feel like they are robbery victims. To me, this seems a very odd construct, and one that bolsters an ethos of victimhood, rather than one of responsibility.
  • 3/12/24, Page 13 – A promissory note that is found, like any other piece of property, might be considered “acquired”. In devious moments, someone might use it to try to collect on a debt that’s actually owed to someone else. But no, the rabbis say, a found promissory note is, basically invalid, and even returning it to the creditor, or the court, hoping for a reward, is useless, since you have no idea if the debt has been settled, and it’s really none of your business.
  • 3/13/24, Page 14 – No one would write an IOU without backing it up with collateral. Or, more accurately, according to the rabbinical folk, no one would accept an IOU without it. Therefore, if someone has a promissory note that doesn’t specify collateral property, the courts assume that it is simply a “scribal error”, and that the borrower’s property is indeed considered collateral when it comes time for collection. Not the way it works these days!
  • 3/14/24, Page 15 – Again, we are back to what either has to be a very different definition of what being a thief, or robber, involves, as we’re back in situations where it seems like those are simply treated as chosen occupations. Over several examples, one stood out – a robber steals land from an owner, is caught and convicted, but goes on to sell the land to someone else. The courts rule that the original owner has a lien against the property and can recover it, or its value, from… the purchaser.
  • 3/15/24, Page 16 – Seriously, the whole “robber” thing is so bizarre. Today the discussion is around whether it’s “fair” to call someone who stole property a robber if the original owner dies, and therefore cannot denounce the thief as a “robber”. Can his children do it on behalf of the estate? Some say yes, some say no. What if the robber dies after stealing the property? Is it fair to call his children, “children of a robber”? After all, this damages his reputation, which is important not just while alive, but after death.
  • 3/16/24, Page 17 – A promissory note is lost, and there is disagreement as to the content. The supposed writer says, “I never wrote a note”. Witnesses say, “yes you did.” The writer says, “Well, I wrote a note, but it didn’t make that promise.” Witnesses say, “Yes it did.”, Writer says, “Well, if it said that, then I already paid it.”. Witnesses say, “No you didn’t.”, Writer says, “You guys were never even there.” Witnesses say, “Yes we were.” Where have we heard a similar set of claims recently, and who from? It’s so hard to think of a name….
  • 3/17/24, Page 18 – If a divorce decree is lost and then found “immediately” it is still valid. If it is found “some time later”, it may not be valid. A search of the city records is instituted, and if there exist both a man and a woman of the same names in the city, regardless of whether they apparently know each other, the decree is invalidated because is is in the realm of possibility that it applies to them, and not to those who claim to have lost the decree. Hang on to your paperwork! And, I don’t know, track down the others of the same name and ask them?
  • 3/18/24, Page 19 – If a lost divorce decree, bill of manumission (release from slavery), or a property deed given as a gift is found, it should be returned to the person who issued it, not the person who it was addressed to. Why? Because maybe it hadn’t been given yet, and the person who wrote it might have a future date in mind when it will become effective. The gift, that makes sense. The other two? I mean, you wouldn’t want to give someone their freedom too early, would you?
  • 3/19/24, Page 20 – Two pages ago we saw that there was concern for the possibility that a found document had to be carefully vetted to make sure that it isn’t delivered to the wrong one of two people with the same name in the same city. Today that is extended to neighboring cities. Further, if you find in your papers a document that you don’t recognize nor know if the conditions have been fulfilled, you are advised to set it aside “until the time Elijah returns and let him sort it out” – essentially, forget about it.
  • 3/20/24, Chapter 2, Page 21 – If you find something and it has nothing that could be used to identify its owner, it’s yours. If there’s anything, even a sliver or shard of something that might help to identify its owner, you must publicize the find, so that a potential owner can contact you and provide proof of his or her ownership by describing whatever it is that’s unique about it.
  • 3/21/24, Page 22 – What about found items that really can’t be marked – sheaves of grain, piles of fruit. Sure, an owner could mark the bundles, the baskets, the crates. But the sages aren’t satisfied. Perhaps those are old binders, baskets, or crates and no longer belong to the person who marked them. And if it’s an easily erased and replaced mark, it could be fake. It really seems like they’re very invested in “finders keepers”. One begins to wonder why.
  • 3/22/24, Page 23 – If loaves of bread are found sitting around in some public space, they must be returned to the person who baked them, if they were baked by a home cook. If, on the other hand, they were baked by a professional baker, they are yours! How do you tell? Oh, it’s just obvious, trust us. Food left out in public will be picked up by Jews, because we don’t waste food. But Gentiles will avoid it, because being the superstitious lot that they are, they’ll be afraid of sorcery.
  • 3/23/24, Page 24 – Scattered coins. Coins bundled together. A purse. All things that one might find without an identifying mark. Still, the rabbis rule, you must proclaim that you found it and see if a fellow Jew claims it and can provide evidence it is his. Unless, of course, it’s in an a primarily Gentiles area, because… their problem, not ours. And besides, they’d lie about it anyway. Is it any wonder, with rulings like this, that money has long been a point of contention between Jews and Gentiles?
  • 3/24/24, Page 25 – In a move worthy of a CSI episode the rabbis discuss what might constitute identifying characteristics of these various piles of coins, grains, vegetables, or meats. They get down to the exact arrangement, the way things are stacked, what touches what, are things side-by-side or in other arrangements (there was, apparently, a specific arrangement dedicated to the Gentile worship of Mercury), and even if something without identifiers is next to something that has them.
  • 3/25/24, Page 26 – If you rent out a home or building, and after a renter leaves you find personal property they left behind, what is your obligation? Well, according to the sages, nothing. A renter who has moved on will “of course” have assumed his property lost to him forever. And maybe it was the property of a previous renter. You don’t know, so just keep it for yourself. This doesn’t sit well with me, nor I imagine, with most of you.
  • 3/26/24, Page 27 – If you buy something, and find, intermingled with whatever you bought, valuables that clearly belong to the seller, you are under no obligation to notify them. You can keep them, unless the seller contacts you and specifically asks about the valuables, and identifies them clearly. This is justified by using a metaphor from Deuteronomy 22:1-3. It may have that scriptural basis, but doesn’t seem to me a righteous way to live and conduct oneself. Just because you can, doesn’t mean you should.
  • 3/27/24, Page 28 – If you find a clearly lost object during a festival, an occasion where people come from afar, you must proclaim its existence for seven days, awaiting claimants. Why a week? Because, obviously, you must allow three days for someone to travel home to wherever they came from, a day to figure out that they lost something, and three days to return to make their claim. Do you not understand how intercity travel works?
  • 3/28/24, Page 29 – If you find a sacred scroll, particularly a Torah scroll, it is incumbent on you to unroll it, a few columns at a time, every couple of months, just to make sure the pages stay supple. If you happen to be a Torah scholar, it’s fine to read from it as you go. But, if you’re not, don’t, as you may be profaning something you don’t understand. Plus, you know, no assessing it for potential resale or pawn value, that’s just a no-no.
  • 3/29/24, Page 30 – If you find an object of value that is useful, it’s fine if you use it while waiting for its owner to claim it. That comes with a caveat – it’s fine if it’s simply useful and aids you in some manner, but not fine if it’s valuable or impressive enough that doing so publicly would make you seem more important or richer than you really are. Stay in your lane.
  • 3/30/24, Page 31 – If you see something that appears abandoned or lost, but it’s in a place where it might easily belong to someone – a cow just outside a fenced pasture, a sack sitting at the side of someone’s owned path – you can’t assume it is lost or abandoned unless it is there three days in a row. On the third day, you can claim it by finder’s rights. Doesn’t square well with “if you see something, say something”. Or, I guess it does – you could always point it out to see if it belongs to someone.
  • 3/31/24, Page 32 – What you do when you see an overburdened pack animal that’s not being attended to? Our obligation to relieve animal suffering tells us we must unload it of its burden, without expectation of compensation. The rabbis end up discussing whether there is an obligation to reload the animal of its burden when the owner is found, without compensation, since you unloaded it. Strangely, the obligation to relieve an animal’s suffering isn’t mentioned in the reloading part.
  • 4/1/24, Page 33 – We’re still on whether there’s an obligation to reload a donkey’s burden after having unloaded it to spare the animal’s suffering. Much of the conversation focuses on whether you can expect remuneration for your labor. I’m still struck by the lack of concern about causing the donkey suffering all over again. I can’t be the only one who reads Deuteronomy 22:4’s “You shall lift them with him” not as instruction to simply load him up, but to help carry some of it, so he doesn’t suffer. Apparently, that didn’t occur to any of the rabbis.
  • 4/2/24, Chapter 3, Page 34 – You agree to take care of a friend’s livestock while they’re away, no charge. One or more of the animals disappears while under your care, either lost or stolen. You’ve sworn under oath that you didn’t steal it, and, you’ve compensated your friend for the loss. Later, the animal is recovered, or the thief is caught, and is forced to make restitution, perhaps even a profitable one. Not to your friend, but to you, as the rabbinical court says that your compensation effected a purchase, and the animal became yours.
  • 4/3/24, Page 35 – We have the case of someone depositing their jewels with a service whose job it is to safeguard them. When he goes to reclaim them, as their value has increased and he wants to sell them, the caretaker says they’ve disappeared, but refuses to take responsibility or pay for them. The court orders him to pay for them at their new assessed value, but also note that had he simply taken responsibility and paid for their former value, they would be his, and he could have profited from their increased value. It’s always a bonus when the judge gives you tips on how to be a better criminal.
  • 4/4/24, Page 36 – This is how conspiracy theories form. You hire someone to take care of your cow. He negligently allows the cow to wander off into a marsh where it could be killed or stolen. But, the cow comes contentedly back. Later, though not much later, it dies of ostensibly normal causes. Or did it? After all, the caretaker was negligent in one thing, maybe he’s negligent in everything? Maybe something mysterious happened on the marsh? Perhaps the Angel of Death is involved?
  • 4/5/24, Page 37 – A thief has stolen, for our purposes, $100, from someone. Multiple people claim the loss. The argument starts with – determine who the thief actually stole from and have him return the money to them. But then it’s proposed that since they all claim loss, he should pay them all a share. Which then leads to he should pay them all the full amount, in order to atone. Interestingly, at no point do the rabbis address that all but one of the claimants is lying.
  • 4/6/24, Page 38 – If someone stores perishable products in a warehouse, and they begin to rot or ferment, what is the responsibility of the caretaker of the warehouse? For the most part, the rabbis say, “none”. The person who stored the items knew they were perishable, and if he didn’t give specific instructions, he accepts all responsibility for their fate. A few argue for circumstances where the caretaker would sell them before they rot and hold the proceeds for the owner, but generally, this seems unpopular. Contacting the owner never seems to occur to anyone.
  • 4/7/24, Page 39 – If the owner of a property is a fugitive, for example, has gone overseas to avoid paying taxes, his property can be considered abandoned, and taken over – by a family member, the court, a lender, even a… squatter. If, on the other hand, the owner is caught, and jailed because of serious crime, until there is a court disposition the court appoints a steward to manage the property, as a family member or friend might collude with the owner.
  • 4/8/24, Page 40 – One of the main reasons I started in on this project was curiosity about the sociology and psychology of the Jewish world 1500-2000 or so years ago when the Talmud, and thus the underpinnings of modern Judaism, were created. It’s been amusing at times, no more so than today, where the rabbinic court rules that a relative who stepped in to help an orphaned minor manage his newly inherited properties is not to be trusted or compensated, because, no one would do that unless they had nefarious designs on the wealth.
  • 4/9/24, Page 41 – We’ve all seen movies and TV shows where someone says something like, “I’m going to close my eyes and count to ten, and if the missing thingamajig shows up on the table, no questions will be asked”. This doesn’t fly with the rabbis, who insist that you can’t just return a lost or stolen item to its rightful place, but you have to do so with the full knowledge, and acknowledgement, of the owner. No anonymous returns!
  • 4/10/24, Page 42 – You should always keep one-third of your money in your possession, one-third invested in your business, and one-third buried in the ground. Such is the rabbinical advice we receive today. There is some debate of the ground-buried money, as, along with the thieves that we’ve discussed before who have all sorts of rights, there are, apparently, “rummagers”, whose career it is to dig up other people’s backyards looking for a score. Several rabbis suggest keeping that third in your attic, but, of course, then it may come within the purview of thieves….
  • 4/11/24, Page 43 – Banks were a much more individualized, private concern in the past. If you deposited money in a bank, you had to clearly indicate that your money was to be safeguarded, not just by telling them so, but by binding it up, and presumably labeling it with your name. The banker could assume that any unbound money was his to use, despite the obvious circumstances, and couldn’t be held liable if it was gone when you returned. You could, however, if you were, say, depositing your organization’s money for safekeeping and didn’t bind it up first.
  • 4/12/24, Chapter 4, Page 44 – When does a transaction legally occur? Not when an item or property is paid for but not yet received. Not when an item or property is received but not yet paid for. Only when an item or property has both been received and paid for. I mean, did these rabbis not watch cop shows on TV? Everyone knows you have to wait until the exchange has been made before you move in for the arrest….
  • 4/13/24, Page 45 – Jews are not allowed to charge other Jews interest on loans, nor repay a loan with more than was lent; and the same holds true for “borrowing property” – an example is given of someone giving you ten eggs, you can’t repay them by giving them a dozen. This doesn’t apply to transactions with Gentiles. But what about repayments in equivalents? Can you use an amount of silver to repay a loan in gold, or vice versa? It’s quite the lively discussion.
  • 4/14/24, Page 46 – Given the prohibition on Jews charging other Jews interest for loans, how did such transactions take place? Let’s face it, people sometimes need a loan, and others aren’t going to just offer them gratis. Try this on. “Loan me X dollars, and I’ll repay you X dollars. I would like, totally unrelated to the loan, to pay your employee’s salaries for a couple of weeks/buy you something nice, just out of my personal generosity. We good?”
  • 4/15/24, Page 47 – On the table today, focusing in on the bathhouse, a place of communal gathering, and cleanliness, is the token. You used a token for entrance, that you’d bought in quantity. The question in front of the rabbis was whether these tokens could be used elsewhere for purchases, since everyone would, eventually use them at the bathhouse. It’s easy to see pro and con views, though in the end, they decided “no”, the tokens had no legal value outside of the bathhouse realm.
  • 4/16/24, Page 48 – If someone pays you money for goods, property, or services, what happens if you change your mind about the sale? As long as you haven’t actually delivered the item, you can back out. Of course, you can be immediately accused of robbery, extorsion, coercion, and just all around bad form. You may even be subject to the displeasure of the sages, and even cursed (not in the spiritual sense, just socially). But, just return the money paid and you can walk away, no legal obligations.
  • 4/17/24, Page 49 – A deposit is made, price of goods goes up, seller insists on more money or giving less goods for the same money. Rabbis agree, though offer that buyer can demand deposit back. But many of them also feel that the seller can refuse to return the deposit and short-change the buyer, which leads to a discussion on fraudulent sales practices. In the end, it seems to come down to “buyer beware” and a very loose definition of what a deposit or down payment guarantees.
  • 4/18/24, Page 50 – You buy something, but suspect that you’ve overpaid, especially as you look around and find the same object available for less. What are your rights? After much discussion, the consensus of the rabbis is that a 1/6, or roughly 17% markup, over cost, is the limit imposed on merchants. They can charge more if they want, but if they do, the buyer is given the right of recission for “the length of time it would take to show the sale to his relatives or other merchants” – basically, a day or so.
  • 4/19/24, Page 51 – Having dealt with the right of recission for the buyer, the sages turn to the seller, after all, there are dishonest buyers out there. First, it is noted that merchants in the city of Lod are scrupulously honest, and if there’s any irregularity in a transaction, it must be the buyer’s fault. Second, since a merchant is presumed expert in his field, in a barter type purchase, if he assesses something and then later finds it lacking, it is assumed the buyer slipped in a substitution.
  • 4/20/24, Page 52 – “…one who would refuse to accept a slightly eroded coin is merely a miserly soul, while the coin is in fact valid for any use.” For all those of us expats and visitors to Argentina who have tried to exchange foreign currency for Argentine pesos, this is an accurate assessment of local moneychangers.
  • 4/21/24, Page 53 – When produce, or money, has been tithed to the Temple or its representatives, it is “sacralized”, i.e., deemed holy, and only for the use of the Temple’s priests. But what happens if there’s… just too much of it? Torah law says that de-sacralized food, objects, or money must be buried. At the same time, the rabbis recognize the waste involved and today argue the moral imperatives to find an acceptable method to not waste those things, and use them for societal good.
  • 4/22/24, Page 54 – What if you change your mind about a contribution to the Temple, and wish it back? After all, the whole sacralized thing, and having to be buried if it’s de-sacralized comes into play. Well, hey, just, you know, pay us 20% interest on the value (wait, I thought we couldn’t charge other Jews interest?), and it’s yours, free and clear. And the 20% is the rounded-up to the next dinar amount. The house always wins.
  • 4/23/24, Page 55 – We still have a current of exploitation and cheating running in the background of these discussions, though I haven’t focused in on it. Today’s is interesting, as it addresses “small claims”. While the average person may well pursue a claim of having been cheated of a lesser amount, the rabbis don’t want the Temple embroiled in legal battles over having been shortchanged, especially since they’re talking about donations, even if obligatory, and they set a minimum for when it’s worth going after a donor.
  • 4/24/24, Page 56 – Amidst all the discussions about exploitation and substitutions of lesser or different materials, goods, or coinage, we have… an exemption. Sort of. While not codified as a consensus opinion, no one seems willing to argue with Rabbi Meir over… bread. He opines that even if you pretty much know that tithed bread is made from unconsecrated grain, or that the bread hasn’t been mixed, formed, and baked with proper procedures and reverence, it’s bread. It’s warm. It’s just out of the oven. Tithe away.
  • 4/25/24, Page 57 – A seller agrees to sell something to a buyer at market price. Between the time of the contract and the date of the transaction, the market price goes up. According to the halakhic rules, the buyer must pay the new price, even though the two agreed on a lower price. Except, of course, if the buyer is the Temple – they pay the lower price, because, again, the house always wins. Interestingly, they never address why a contract written for a specific price doesn’t have to be honored, nor what happens if the market price goes down.
  • 4/26/24, Page 58 – If we hire someone and pay them on a daily basis, we can’t pay them for working on the Sabbath, and therefore, anything they are normally considered responsible for, like, say, security of property, they are absolved of their responsibility. Therefore, they must be hired on a weekly, monthly, or yearly basis, which will just happen to include the Sabbath(s), and then they are considered responsible. My mind, such that it is, immediately thinks of the possibility of an inside job type theft where the guard gets himself hired as a day laborer for a Saturday shift….
  • 4/27/24, Page 59 – So much in today’s passage. Exploitation is, apparently, okay, if you as the seller can see that the buyer will pay pretty much anything to get something you have – such as, example given, you have a matching pearl to one they already have and they really want a pair. Exploitation of someone’s time, apparently, is not acceptable, such as pretending to be interested in buying clothing, or a home, when you have no intention of doing so – being a “phantom buyer” is a no-no!
  • 4/28/24, Page 60 – Ah, the dichotomy between wholesalers and retailers stretches back millennia. A grower of produce, or grain, or a winemaker, cannot adulterate their product – mixing old and new vegetables, or grains, or adding sediment to wine to make it seem older, or watering it down to stretch it – and then selling it to a retailer. However, a retailer can do any of those things, even mixing together produce, grain, or wine from different producers, because… why? Because he’s doing it to make the product more attractive to customers. Obviously.
  • 4/29/24, Chapter 5, Page 61 – We’re back, as we often are, to “intention”. A look at the differences between robbery, exploitation, and charging interest, the first two generally without informed consent, the latter, the rabbis muse, might ought to be a personal choice by the parties involved. But no, God can see your intentions, and can tell that you charging interest is based on that little touch of wickedness and greed in your heart. But only when it’s being charged to “your brother”, i.ei., a fellow Jew.
  • 4/30/24, Page 62 – Does the idea of share and share alike hold true in a situation where, as today’s example posits, you only have enough food or water for one of two people to survive to reach safety – if you share, you both die. For much of Talmudic history, sharing was considered the correct option, on the premise that you might just both make it. Rabbi Akiva came in and said, nonsense, deal with the fact that only one of you is to live, and screw the sharing. This remains unsettled, as well as unsettling.
  • 5/1/24, Page 63 – A producer owes someone money. The person comes to collect, as he needs the money to buy wheat. The producer tells him to go find the price of wheat, come back, and they’ll make a deal for the proper amount. When he returns, he mentions he plans to buy some wine. The producer repeats the process. Then again with olive oil. It’s an obvious delaying tactic, and the rabbis rule that unless he has all four things – the money he owes, or its value in wheat, wine, and olive oil, his tactics amount to cheating.
  • 5/2/24, Page 64 – You see ten lovely small squashes and give the seller money for them. He offers that he’s got lovelier, and larger squashes, due to be harvested soon – if you’re willing to wait, they’re yours at the same price. Is that a form of “interest”, given that he’s giving you more than you paid for? If he already has a few larger squashes around, but just not enough to give you ten, then no, because they’re a regular product. If he currently has none, then larger, lovelier squashes are considered an interest payment, and forbidden.
  • 5/3/24, Page 65 – While you can’t raise the price of an object after a sale is completed and try to collect additional, you can raise rent after a deal is struck and demand more for a lease to continue. It’s up to the renter to decide whether to continue renting or not. It’s interesting that the sages don’t consider that a period of time might be specified in a lease. I wonder how they handle things in modern times where leases are written, and include conditions like time period?
  • 5/4/24, Page 66 – A borrower offers his land in lieu of repayment of a loan. The questions that arise are “when did he offer it?” Was it when the loan was made? When at some point he realized he wouldn’t be able to repay it? When he failed to repay it and offered it out of shame? Had he been drinking beer? If so, was it to steady his nerves, or was he drunk? Was he under duress from the lender? Rabbinical minds want to know these and other things before ruling on the validity of his promise.
  • 5/5/24, Page 67 – A person borrows money from someone else and allows the lender to live on his property, and consume produce from the fields – both in repayment of the loan. Essentially, prepaying room and board. But he overstays the allotted time and/or consumes more than his share of food. Surely this is an example of “interest” exploitation? No, say the rabbis, it’s merely a “hint of interest”, because the time and food are both “already gone” and while he is removed from the property, he owes nothing back to the borrower.
  • 5/6/24, Page 68 – One could invest money in someone else’s business, expecting a share of the profits, even though arguably that would be a form of interest. To get around it, contracts were written for a repayment amount that included the profits built in – I’m not clear how that sidesteps the interest, to me, it seems to reinforce it, but the rabbis were cool with it. If the business didn’t make the hoped for profit, the contract was ignored and the repayment adjusted down. Yeah, that would work in today’s society.
  • 5/7/24, Page 69 – Two Kutim, Samaritans come to Rav Pappa as in a business deal, one divided the monetary proceeds unilaterally – Pappa says it’s fine because money is money and it’s equally divided. The next year the same, but with barrels of wine. This time he rules against the divider, noting that some wine is good, some is not, and it should be a joint decision. Of note is that two foreigners chose a rabbi to adjudicate their business dispute rather than a civil court, because he was more likely to be fair and just.
  • 5/8/24, Page 70 – An exception to the whole “no lending money and charging interest” thing is orphans. As “fatherless children”, they are exempt from halakhic proscriptions because “they don’t have their father to guide them”. And, of course, since they are minors, an adult can lend the money out “on their behalf”. And no doubt take a portion of it for his troubles.
  • 5/9/24, Page 71 – As noted earlier in this tractate, there is no prohibition against charging interest on a loan made to a gentile, a non-Jew. Today’s page explores the conversion process, contrasting a “ger tzedek”, someone who converts formally and a “ger toshav”, someone who lives within the Jewish community and follows the practices, but has not formally converted. The former are treated as full Jews, the latter, the rabbis rule, in this case, can be charged a modicum of interest – just enough “to make a living”.
  • 5/10/24, Page 72 – I was wondering after yesterday’s post if we’d explore the opposite side of the equation. What about a gentile who has lent money, charging interest, who then converts to Judaism? Can he still collect the interest? If I’m reading this right, and it’s pretty nuanced, it depends on when he made the loan versus when he converted. Basically, if the loan was made anytime after he started his conversion process, or expressed he was going to, no, he can’t collect interest on it.
  • 5/11/24, Page 73 – What are the rules when a seller throws in a little something extra, unbidden by the buyer? Is that a form of interest payment? No, say the sages, first, the buyer didn’t solicit it, and second, the seller is not giving it as a form of extra compensation, but as a gift in order to secure repeat business. So go ahead and accept that complimentary glass of champagne, or free dessert at your local eatery!
  • 5/12/24, Page 74 – The seller of olives is only responsible for delivering olives. He is not responsible for the process of turning those olives into olive oil, nor for the quality of the oil. It is incumbent on they buyer to decide which olives he wants to make oil from. How does this relate to questions of interest? Because if a buyer has only paid for olives, and the seller throws in part or all of the process of turning them into oil, that would be considered interest, and is not allowed unless paid for in addition.
  • 5/13/24, Page 75 – Apparently, as we wrap up this chapter, acknowledgement of one’s awareness of the prohibition against interest trumps all. If one announces at the time of a deal that he intends to payback, or return something loaned, be it cash, an object, or an ingredient, or whatever, with a larger amount than borrowed, as long as he states it isn’t interest, but a gift, it’s all good. Thanks Mr. Banker for the money to buy my house, let me pay you back along with enough for you to buy yours too!
  • 5/14/24, Chapter 6, Page 76 – Salary disputes are nothing new. On today’s page the rabbis debate over situations where a recruiter for an employer offers more, or less, to new employees, than the employer stipulated. And, from the other side, employees who do more, or less, work than that for which they were contracted. Who owes whom what? For the most part, the sages land on the formal terms of the agreement, with the recruiter having to make up excess promises to workers, and employers not owing wages for work not performed or contracted.
  • 5/15/24, Page 77 – If you hire field workers to irrigate your fields, and during the night, it rained and irrigation is no longer necessary, you don’t owe them anything, because, well, it’s a natural act that you couldn’t foresee. However, if, rather than rain, the local river suddenly rises and floods your fields, and irrigation is no longer necessary, you owe them their wages, because obviously, anyone could have looked at the river and foreseen that happening. What? WTF?
  • 5/16/24, Page 78 – Our old friend “intention” is back, as the rabbis analyze situations where someone contracted to perform work achieves a different result from what hey were contracted to do, i.e., they don’t follow the employer’s intentions. The debate comes down to the intentionality on the part of the contracted person, if it was intentional, they are liable, if it was unintentional, then it depends on whether the different result was foreseeable given the circumstances, or not.
  • 5/17/24, Page 79 – If you rent a donkey and it gets sick or goes mad halfway through the trip, who is obligated to do what? If you are in an area where donkeys are commonly rented, the proprietor must give you another donkey to replace the first, and you go on your way. If you are in an area where donkey rentals are not common, you walk away, but owe for the distance the donkey traveled. Also, if the designated donkey rider is a man, it is not legal to let a woman ride the donkey, because, you know, women donkey drivers…. Car rental agencies, take note.
  • 5/18/24, Page 80 – While there’s an implied “read the fine print” in today’s rabbinical discussion, the ultimate takeaway is that if a seller slips in notification of a defect in his product as part of a list of potential defects, in order to hide it away among things that are of no import to the buyer, or that the buyer can see aren’t the case, the entire transaction is invalid, and the seller is considered guilty of fraud, no ifs, ands, or buts. That would upend modern day litigation.
  • 5/19/24, Page 81 – Although they are used for yet another lesson in liability, I am taken down a tangent as I learn of the existence of ahayulei, or “ice plant dealers”. Purveyors of a leafy succulent that was apparently important enough in the local diet in Israel that it has a profession, let alone a Talmudic lesson, dedicated to it. The ice plant is both edible and medicinal, and is still used today in recipes in the region, as well as elsewhere where it grows. Learn something new every day!
  • 5/20/24, Page 82 – You break it, you buy it. That’s the general message of today’s page. But it comes tinged, as it is in modern times, with discussions about intent and level of negligent behavior. Were the actions of the person who broke something such that they could reasonably be assumed to lead to breakage, or were they benign and the breakage accidental? And even if accidental, might the breaker still have a moral, if not legal, obligation to make things right?
  • 5/21/24, Chapter 7, Page 83 – If an officer of the law spots someone in a tavern in the afternoon, dozing off at their table over their drinks, he should ask them to produce evidence that they are either a scholar who arose early in order to study, a day laborer who arose early to do finish his work before the sun got too hot in the sky, or a night laborer who toiled all night long. If he is none of these three, he is a thief and can safely be arrested. There were, apparently, no other possibilities.
  • 5/22/24, Page 84 – According to the sages Yohannon, Yismael, and Yossi, when accused of being so fat that they couldn’t possibly have ever had sex, God made up for their obesity by, well, giving them large penises. Their claims ranged between 5 and 9 “kav”. A kav is a container sufficient to hold 144, 12 dozen, eggs. Nine kav would be the equivalent volume of over 15 gallons. I’m guessing they were exaggerating.
  • 5/23/24, Page 85 – Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was a big hypochondriac baby. Change my mind. One day he announced that his eye hurt. His healer went to put eyedrops in his eye, but he screamed out at the approach, claiming he couldn’t bear the pain of the eyedrops. So the healer switched to a salve to place around his eye, to the same response. The healer, exasperated, gave him some herbs to put under his pillow. HaNasi’s pain just magically disappeared.
  • 5/24/24, Page 86 – Schmuel Yarhina’a was Rabbi HaNasi’s – yesterday’s hypochondriac – physician. Said rabbi is so grateful for his “cure”, that he proposes naming Schmuel to be a rabbi. Schmuel demurs, noting that he’s more useful as a doctor, and also claiming (in a vision?) to have seen “Adam’s book”, a mystical genealogy, which lists him as a physician, but lists HaNasi and Rabbi Natan, as the final tosefot, Torah commentators, and no one after them should be paid attention to. I guess I can stop this project right here.
  • 5/25/24, Page 87 – The sages are off on a discussion of character, inspired by their readings of Genesis 18. Here, we are told, is the proof that “the righteous say little and do much, whereas the wicked say much and do not do even a little”. In the current world political climate, this seems worth keeping in mind.
  • 5/26/24, Page 88 – If fruits or vegetables have fallen from their vine, bush, or tree, to whom do they belong? This is a topic that has come up before – in general, the rabbinic decision is to leave them for the poor, or for animals. In today’s discussion, it is noted that one’s own oxen are allowed to eat their fill, and the question is raised, what about field-hands? They’re often poor, and why should they have fewer eating rights than an ox? The rabbis agree, they can eat fallen produce as well, without penalty.
  • 5/27/24, Page 89 – No cheating on yesterday’s eating of fallen produce. That’s to say, you can’t “accidentally” drop produce on the ground and then eat it. Likewise, for produce that doesn’t just fall, for example, harvesting of root vegetables, you can’t eat those, because they’re on, or in the ground, where they’re supposed to be.
  • 5/28/24, Page 90 – Your cow is eating produce or grain that upsets its digestive system and puts it in distress. Should you muzzle it, which might cause it distress not just physically, but emotionally, since it will see the produce and grain and long for it? Neither, say the sages. Preempt the issue and make sure it has plenty of food that is good for it, and this whole question will be moot. This might well apply to children and spouses, no?
  • 5/29/24, Page 91 – The rabbis of the Talmud were not exactly free speech advocates. Today’s case involves someone who intentionally substitutes a non-consecrated animal for a consecrated one for a sacrifice. The official punishment is 40 lashes. It is, however, noted that in order that the priests not be complicit, the non-consecrated animal is now considered consecrated for sacrificial purposes, but the punishment is still carried out, for having lied about the animal’s status, even though the lie is no longer a lie. Also, bonus track, you can’t make bread by kneading flour with milk or butter, because it might be served with meat and violate kosher law.
  • 5/30/24, Page 92 – The rabbis recognize that treating one’s employees well is an imperative. In particular, making sure they are well fed. And even, they admonish, if the employee eats more than his salary’s worth of food. For some reason, they single out cucumbers, dates, and grapes as fair game fare for the average laborer. They do recommend to workers, however, to not over-indulge, as it may hurt their chances at future job offers.
  • 5/31/24, Page 93 – A master is required to make sure his slaves are well-fed, and paid for their labor. Biblical slavery within the Jewish community was more like what we’d think of as indentured servitude – obligated to work off a debt. The master may offer him or her higher wages in lieu of some percentage of the food they eat, but cannot reduce the food below nutritionally adequate levels, and, only with the slave’s agreement.
  • 6/1/24, Chapter 8, Page 94 – If you borrow someone’s cow and it dies while it is in your care, you owe them for the cow. If, however, you engage the services of the owner at the same time, as a package deal, then the liability is his and you owe nothing if something happens to his cow.
  • 6/2/24, Page 95 – If someone is paid to be a security guard, watchman, safe deposit, of some sort, and loses your valuables – to an actual loss, or a theft – he is liable for double the value. Unless the theft was armed robbery, then he’s only responsible for the value itself, not for a penalty.
  • 6/3/24, Page 96 – If a borrower uses a cow for purposes that a cow is not normally borrowed for, and a mishap occurs, does he incur liability. After all, if there was a simple accident while milking a cow, or, well, milking a cow, since they don’t seem to have an alternative for normal uses, there may well be no liability since it was just an accident. On the other hand, if he borrowed the cow and engaged with it in bestiality, is an accident just an accident anymore? Weighty questions today. Weighty questions.
  • 6/4/24, Page 97 – Following on yesterday’s cow bestiality liability case, we turn to a man who overindulges in intercourse with one or more women, to the point where he dies from exertion, exhaustion, stroke, or cardiac arrest. As long as his pleasures were voluntary, women will be pleased to know that they will not be held liable for his expiration, as the liability is accounted as solely his own.
  • 6/5/24, Page 98 – A borrower is “in the driver’s seat” when it comes to taking possession of borrowed items or animals or whatever. That’s to say, until they physically take possession, they are not considered liable for the borrowed entity. Unless… they designate someone or some company to retrieve the item or animal on their behalf, at which point they become liable when their agent takes possession.
  • 6/6/24, Page 99 – Apparently axes are exempt from the “once you take possession you’re liable” rule. An axe does not become the possession for liability purposes until the borrower takes the first swing at chopping wood with it. Other uses for axes are not debated.
  • 6/7/24, Page 100 – There’s a lot of oath taking going on on today’s page. Basically, we have disagreement between the two parties to a transaction as to its details, putting possession and liability in doubt. What’s interesting to me is that they discuss having one or both parties take an oath as to their position, but it doesn’t seem to occur to them that one or the other might… lie. Even to God.
  • 6/8/24, Page 101 – I’m not sure how I can apply this to a modern situation. A flood washes away your olive trees and leaves them in someone else’s fields. They take root. The owner of the field could uproot them if he doesn’t want them, or care for them if he does. For the first three years, however, the crop from the trees is 100% yours, but after three years, you split it 50:50 with the field’s owner, if he shares in the costs of caring for them.
  • 6/9/24, Page 102 – You may remember that the Jewish lunar calendar adds in an extra month here and there (seven times in each nineteen year cycle) to compensate for the fact that it only has 354 days in a year. If you make an agreement on a yearly rent, be careful of the wording. If it says “pay $12000, $1200 per month” and a “leap year” comes along, you end up owing an extra month. Reverse the order – $1200 per month, until a total of $12000 for the year, you get a free month.
  • 6/10/24, Chapter 9, Page 103 – At the end of the harvest, how is the field prepared for the next planting? That, is the question facing the rabbis today – does one uproot all the plants, clearing the land completely, or does one cut the plants down to “stubble”. And who gets to decide? The owner of the land or those he’s hired to tend the fields? Legally, the owner, they decide, though it might not be a bad idea if he listens to the expert he hired.
  • 6/11/24, Page 104 – Typically the Talmudic rabbis debate and decide things according to halakhic law and issue rulings on that basis. In an interesting digression from that approach, in a debate over commercial contracts for land use, they acknowledge that the halakha, the Torah standard, may simply not apply in the course of common interactions, which are conducted according to local custom. Sometimes doing business is just doing business.
  • 6/12/24, Page 105 – Someone goes into business with an investor who stays out of the day to day operations. The business loses money, for whatever reason. The businessman goes to great lengths to replace the money and pay back the investor, in order to preserve his reputation and the relationship. If he fails to do so, he cannot, at that point, inform the investor and expect to share the loss, because, the rabbis opine, he clearly valued his reputation over being honest, and therefore bears the entire liability.
  • 6/13/24, Page 106 – In a long and winding discussion, like so many of them, the rabbis discuss what to do if the person you hire to plant your fields plants different crops than you asked for – such as barley, or another cereal grain, instead of, say, wheat. The discussion involves wind blasting and grasshoppers and liability, and I am left with the impression that wheat does not succumb to wind blasting, and grasshoppers don’t eat it. Learn something new every day.
  • 6/14/24, Page 107 – The power of a loaf of bread, especially first thing in the day, is legion. It protects the body from heat, cold, winds, and harmful spirits. Consuming it can increase both intelligence and wisdom. It increases one’s ability to study and teach Torah, and the charisma to have people pay attention. It’s basically a gamer’s stat food.
  • 6/15/24, Page 108 – Torah scholars share in contributions to community infrastructure just like their neighbors – things like paying for water supply, which in modern times one could extend to other utilities. But there is one exception, the defense of the community, be it the then equivalent of police or military. It is assumed that their piety brings with it divine defense from God. This, btw, is a big part of why the ultra-orthodox and/or chassidim, have not historically served in the Israeli military.
  • 6/16/24, Page 109 – Off on a tangent, as today’s passage keeps referring to “vegetables and beets” in discussions of farming and harvesting. Why are beets singled out? They were not the only root crop grown – there were carrots, radishes. onions, leeks, and garlic, certainly. I doubt we’ll ever have a definitive answer, but historians have posited various things elevating the status of the beet – source of sugar, detoxifier, easy to grow in arid ground, doubles as cow fodder.
  • 6/17/24, Page 110 – In what might be one of the first codified in writing examples of eminent domain, the rabbis discuss compensation for the owner of a tree that is planted near a city when the city wants it cut down for whatever reason. If the tree was there before the city, they owe the owner of the tree compensation. However, if it was planted after the city was founded, even though outside of the city limits, they owe nothing. Either way, the tree is gone.
  • 6/18/24, Page 111 – Day (or night) workers are to be paid on the same day that they worked, at the finish of their labors. Basically, if they are Jewish or non-Jewish but follow the “Noahide laws”, they are to be paid before nightfall (or sunrise if they work at night). If they’re not Jewish or followers, they must be paid before the start of the next work day (or night). It seems a minor difference, but at the same time says volumes about the relationship between religious factions.
  • 6/19/24, Page 112 – Not paying an hourly or daily worker at the completion of his work is considered as if you’ve robbed him of his soul, and set about to kill him. So say the rabbis. What if a worker is contracted to produce something or complete a project? Compensation is tied to either the completion of the project, or the receipt of the item produced, and payment must be made the same day. This can lead to issues if the person paying doesn’t come to a shop to pick up a completed item, to which the rabbinical response is, “then technically, it now belongs to the person who did the work”.
  • 6/20/24, Page 113 – I love when there are just little quirky rulings in the Talmud. If someone owes you a debt, and doesn’t pay by the due date, you can take collateral from him. You can’t personally enter his property to do so, but an agent of the court can do so for you. There is one caveat (really two, but it’s more fun to just use this one) – if you take his bedding, you are required, each night, to return his pillow to him so he can sleep comfortably, and then you can pick it up in the morning again.
  • 6/21/24, Page 114 – When taking “collateral”, or in some cases, possessions to satisfy a debt, it is incumbent on the creditor to leave the debtor sufficient resources to continue to live, albeit “at a lower standard” than he’s used to. Enough to keep a roof over his head and food on the table, and, in a self-serving rabbinical ruling, enough to pay his regular consecration tithes to the Temple and/or local houses of worship. After all, why should the priests and rabbis be deprived?
  • 6/22/24, Page 115 – Way back when we spent multiple pages on the “Sabbatical Year”, when all debts are cancelled. Much of that tractate was dedicated to ways around it – both from the lender’s side of not wanting to lose whatever money he’d invested, but also the borrower, because otherwise, who would loan him anything with that year coming. Now it turns out – any debt backed by collateral is not subject to cancellation. Why didn’t they all just do that?
  • 6/23/24, Chapter 10, Page 116 – If you rent out rooms or an apartment or a home to someone and at some point it becomes uninhabitable due to the need for repairs, you are required to provide alternate living space for the renter until the repairs are done. That includes, if you have nothing else available, sharing your own home with them until their rented space is habitable again. Quite the incentive to make repairs as soon as needed.
  • 6/24/24, Page 117 – A house is co-owned by two people, one who occupies the lower floor, one the upper floor. It collapses or burns down. One owner wants to rebuild, one owner does not. The rabbinical court rules that the one who wants to rebuild can rebuild one or both floors, at his own expense, and occupy the whole thing. The other cannot occupy or benefit from the property unless and until he pays his share. Seems fair.
  • 6/25/24, Page 118 – Payment for work must be made not just in a timely manner as discussed on previous pages, but in the manner originally agreed to. If you promised to pay cash, you pay cash. You can offer an alternative, something in barter, perhaps, or another type of currency, but the worker is under no obligation to accept anything but the originally agreed on method. Further, if he accepts an alternative once, that does not obligate him to accept it again in the future.
  • 6/26/24, Page 119 – A tiered garden, the upper and lower tiers owned by different people. Vegetables are found growing out of the wall that separates them, to whom to they belong? Some say the upper garden owner, because if he removed some dirt from his tier, there would be no wall to grow from; others say the lower tier owner because if he filled in his garden there would be no wall to grow from. Unresolved. We end Bava Metzia with a literal cliffhanger, if you will.

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